The Farndale Cocktail
An explosive blend of Farndale
firepower
The
Northern Army Group
General
Sir Martin Farndale KCB commanded the Northern Army Group (“NORTHAG”)
of NATO during the Cold War.
As the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (“NATO”) lined up from Scandinavia to
southern Europe to face the Warsaw Pact, the NATO defensive force was divided
into three. The Scandinavian force, the Allied Forces Northern Europe, defended
the icy north. NORTHAG protected the line of defence from the Baltic to the
Harz mountains. The Central Army Group (“CENTAG “) was deployed to the
south.
NORTHAG
comprised five Corps, a Dutch, German, British, Belgian and French Corps, with
an American Corps based in the United States to act as its reserve force and to
arrive, perhaps jet lagged, by air as the war started. Each Corps comprised
about 77,000 soldiers. The size of the entire British Army in 2024 is circa 75,000
soldiers.
NATO’s
central region in 1989
In the NATO
command structure NORTHAG reported to Allied Forces Central Europe (“AFCENT”),
which in turn reported to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (“SHAPE”).
NORTHAG’s responsibility was the defence of the North German plains from south
of the river Elbe to the city of Kassel. The defence north of the Elbe was the
task of Allied Land Forces Command Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (“COMLANDJUT”),
while south of Kassel it was the task of CENTAG.
Commander in
Chief of NORTHAG was the commanding General of the British Army of the Rhine (“BAOR”).
The Chief of Staff was a German Major General, with a Belgian or Dutch Major
General as alternates.
Northern
Army Group was assigned the following formations. I Dutch Corps comprised the Dutch
1st, 4th and 5th Mechanized Divisions and the 101st Infantry Brigade. From July
1985 the German 3rd Panzer Division was added. I German Corps comprised the 1st
Panzer Division, 7th Panzer Division, 11th Panzer grenadier Division, and 27th
Airborne Brigade. I British Corps comprised the 1st Armoured Division, 3rd and
4th Armoured, and 2nd Infantry Division. I Belgian Corps comprised the 1st
Infantry and 16th Armoured Division. III French Corps was reserve corps comprising
the 2nd Armoured Division, and 10th Armoured, and 8th Infantry Division. III
(US) Corps was also assigned as reserve corps. 3rd Brigade, 2nd Armoured
Division was forward deployed at Garlstedt. The rest
of 2nd Armoured Division, along with 1st Cavalry Division, 5th Infantry
Division (Mech), 212th Field Artillery Brigade and 3rd Armoured Cavalry
Regiment would join NORTHAG through Operation Reforger
within days after an outbreak of hostilities. They would draw their equipment
from POMCUS depots in the Netherlands, Belgium and North Rhine-Westphalia.
These
organizations fell in peacetime under their respective national command
authorities. Only in the case of attack did operational control over the Corps
automatically transfer to NORTHAG.
Air support
was provided by 2 ATAF. During peacetime NORTHAG multi-national staff commanded
13th Belgian Telecommunications Company, 28th Signal Regiment, Royal Signals, German
Telecommunications Battalion 840, Dutch telecommunications company and NORTHAG
telecommunications company, which consisted of soldiers from all four nations. In
the case of war the headquarters of the 2nd ATAF and NORTHAG would be relocated
to the Joint Operations Centre (“JOC”), a bunker complex in the St. Pietersberg in Maastricht area.
The Army
Group headquarters (“HQ”) was established on 1 November 1952 in Bad Oeynhausen. The Army Group headquarters relocated in 1954
to Rheindahlen. The HQ complex near Mönchengladbach contained NORTHAG HQ and three other
command posts; the headquarters of the Second Allied Tactical Air Force, BAOR
and Royal Air Force Germany (“RAFG”).
Previously,
21st Army Group had been on the left flank of the Allied advance into Germany,
and had advanced into the North German Plain. This may have been the reason
that a four-corps sized formation, which would usually be considered an army,
was given the title of 'Army group'.
During the
construction of the main Joint Headquarters (“JHQ”) building, a Frankish
battle axe was found. It was the badge NORTHAG chose because the Franks were a
Western Europeans defending against attackers from the East. In the year 451 AD
the Franks defeated an army under the leadership of Attila at Châlons-sur-Marne
and thus ended a conquest of Western Europe by the Huns.
General Sir
Nigel Bagnall was Commander of NORTHAG in the rank of General from 1 July 1983.
As Commander of NORTHAG he grappled with NATO's strategy of forward defence,
and he persuaded the Germans that some ground would have to be surrendered to
withstand a massive Soviet Army attack. General Bagnall became Chief of the
General Staff in 19856 and was promoted to Field Marshall in 1988.
Martin
Farndale commanded the British Corps, 1st British Corps, comprising the
fighting element of the British Army of the Rhine, between 1983 and 1985 as
Lieutenant General and immediately afterwards he became Commander NORTHAG as a
full general from 1985 to 1987. Martin
followed Nigel Bagnall’s initiative to re-orientate NORTHAG’s defensive plans
from a static defence to a more mobile approach. By 1986, this plan envisioned
the formation of armour-heavy reserves held under army group command.
Ground
operations relating to the crisis in former Yugoslavia began in late 1992. In
November 1992, the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
provided with an operational headquarters drawn from HQ NORTHAG, including a
staff of some 100 personnel, equipment, supplies and initial financial support.
On 24 June
1993, the headquarters of NORTHAG and 2 ATAF officially disbanded during a
military ceremony.
The last
commander of NORTHAG was General Sir Charles Guthrie, KCB LVO OBE. The last
Chief of Staff was Major General Helmut Willmann, later commander of the Eurocorps.
The
Concentration of Force
One of the
key principles of War is the Concentration of Force being the concentration of
military force so as to bring to bear such overwhelming force against a portion
of an enemy force that the disparity between the two forces alone acts as a
force multiplier in favour of the concentrated forces.
Thus it has
long been a key military strategy in attack to concentrate force at a small
perhaps vulnerable point of the battlefield in order to punch through and
overwhelm the defender. That was known to be the strategy of the Warsaw Pact.
It was often applied unsuccessfully in World War 1.
The
principle is equally important in defence. Hadrian’s Wall provided a physical
barrier, but was defended by very small numbers of soldiers. Their job was
simply to use the barrier of the wall to slow any attack and to signal to forts
of legions behind the line, who would focus their force in defence at the point
of any attack.
In World War
2 concentration of force in defence was often used successfully. In March 1943
Field Marshall Von Manstein faced a concentrated
attack by the Soviet force at Kharkov. He allowed his enemy force to penetrate
deep into his territory before ordering a powerful counter strike into the soft
tail of the concentrated force, thus cutting off its logistical tail and leaving
the attacking force exposed and without supplies. The strategy for an attacker
can be a dangerous one if over exploited. A strategy of concentration of force
in attack can be met with concentrated force in defence. Thus a strategy of a thin
red line, spreading a defence force equally along the line of defence, was
long recognised as an ineffective strategy.
The Strategy
developed by NATO in response to the Warsaw Pact threat was focused on the
concentration of effective force. This was a key part of the strategy of a more
mobile defence. NATO commanders intended to allow significant penetration by
Warsaw Pact attackers into western European territory but to apply their own
concentrated force at the most vulnerable moment against the attacking force.
This involved a careful strategy of intelligence gathering and anticipating the
progression of enemy forces.
The
Farndale Cocktail
Martin
Farndale was an artillery officer by background. He understood the
importance of the combined firepower of the infantry and tank units with the
firepower of infantry mortar units, artillery batteries, helicopter anti tank squadrons, and airpower.
He devised a
strategy to concentrate not only the force of tanks and infantry, but the whole
firepower of air, artillery and helicopters, at a decisive point in the
battlefield.
His strategy
was to provide a coordination of arms so as to concentrate the combined weight
of the defending force at a decisive point of battle. This involved careful planning
and technical coordination, which in turn needed to be well practiced in
peacetime exercises. Ultimately it was the demonstration of the effective use
of arms that would provide the essential deterrent to prevent the Cold War
becoming a hot war.
His strategy
became known as the Farndale Cocktail. Cheers!
or
Go
Straight to General Sir Martin Farndale KCB